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LETTER TO JUDGE HARRY EDWARDS
James J. White*

Dear Harry:
I write to second your statements concerning the disjunction between legal education and the legal profession and also to quibble with
you. By examining the faculty, the curriculum, and the research
agenda at Michigan, your school and mine, I hope to illustrate the
ways in which you are right and to suggest other ways in which you
and your clerk informants may be too pessimistic.
I.

THE FACULTY

A comparison of the faculty of the law school today with the
faculty as it existed in one of the school's prior golden periods, the late
1950s, shows dramatic differences. Today, about one-third of our
faculty is AC/DC. For this purpose an AC/DC is anyone who: (1)
holds an indefinite appointment in the law school and in any other
department of the University, (2) has both a J.D. and a Ph.D., or (3)
has a J.D. and writes principally in a cognate nonlaw area. For the
purpose of this paper, all who are not AC/DCs are "lawyers."
The AC/DCs come in at least three forms and the different forms
have markedly differing stripes. The earliest AC/DCs are J.B. White
and others, such as Richard Posner, who have law degrees but no
Ph.D. in their cognates (J.D. only). They are now graying, and their
type will ultimately be driven from the market by the new wave of
J.D./Ph.D.s. In the future most self-respecting lawyer-economists or
lawyer-philosophers will (, la our newly tenured Avery Katz) have
both a J.D. and a Ph.D. Second are those with a Ph.D. or comparable
degree but without a J.D. (Ph.D. w/o). The earliest representative of
that class on our faculty was Andy Watson, a psychiatrist. Current
Ph.D.s w/o are Michael Bradley from the Business School, Phoebe
Ellsworth from the Psychology Department, Bruce Frier from the
Classics Department, and Don Herzog from Political Science. The
Ph.D.s w/o differ systematically not only from the lawyers, but also
from the J.D.s only and the J.D./Ph.D.s. I would say they are more
careful scholars than we lawyers and, sensitive to their nonlawyer status, they are sometimes more careful lawyers than lawyers themselves.
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1956,
Amherst College; J.D. 1962, University of Michigan Law School. - Ed.
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Finally are the J.D./Ph.D.s. This crop includes Merritt Fox, Tom
Green, Heidi Feldman (a Ph.D. in bud), Avery Katz, Rick Lempert,
Catharine MacKinnon, Bill Miller, Don Regan, and Phil Soper. Some
of these were J.D.s first and Ph.D.s second (at least one vice versa),
but most of them pursued the degrees simultaneously. Typically their
Ph.D. was granted later because it takes longer to take the course
work and write the dissertation than it does to complete a three-year
course of study in law school. This year's new recruit pool was full of
talented young J.D./Ph.D.s.
One of your accusations will surely strike a raw nerve with the
AC/DCs. This is the charge that AC/DCs are second-class economists, philosophers, political scientists, and the like. On our faculty,
that is not correct. Consider first the Ph.D.s w/o. Without exception
the Ph.D.s w/o have outstanding records in their own fields. The law
school faculty was attracted to them principally because of their high
standing in the Arts and Sciences. They give away nothing to the
other members of the law faculty in their standing in their cognate
fields. They have degrees from distinguished institutions and, at least
as frequently as the lawyers, are the beneficiaries of offers from other
distinguished places that try to woo them away. Looking at our
Ph.D.s w/o, I would say that your point is exactly wrong. It appears
to me that we are not dipping out the mediocre, but skimming the best
and the brightest from the Arts and Sciences both as scholars and as
teachers. Their standing in the Arts and Sciences universe equals or
exceeds that of our lawyers in the law universe.
I believe the same is true of the J.D./Ph.D.s and of the J.D.s only.
Nothing tells me that Rick Lempert, Don Regan, Phil Soper, Bill
Miller, J.B. White, or the other Ph.D./J.D.s or J.D.s w/o do not have
first-rate standing in their other disciplines. Because most of these
professors never established an independent reputation in another discipline, the J.D./Ph.D.s have not achieved the same status outside of
law as the Ph.D.s w/o - who, by hypothesis, came to our attention
principally because of their standing in their other discipline.
If there is a danger in hiring a large population of AC/DCs, it is
not that one will get second-rate scholars, but that one will get firstrate economists, philosophers, and classicists who are attracted to the
law school not by an interest in the law, but by its generous pay and
perquisites. I would not accuse any of our current AC/DCs of such
motives (though some might be guilty), but I think I saw one or two
pretenders during the interviewing season this year. Thes' were young
J.D./Ph.D.s who had thin answers to questions about their interest in
law. One of them naively admitted that there were only two reason-
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able spots in the country at good schools of Arts and Sciences for his
particular area of expertise. He did not need to explain to me that law
teachers' salaries are substantially higher than the salaries in his Arts
and Sciences field. There is a risk, therefore, that people who should
be in the departments of History, Philosophy, or Economics will come
to the law school not because of a sincere interest in the law, but because there are more places in the law and because those places carry
better salaries and more perquisites. The hard times that we face may
protect us from these pretenders; in times of financial stringency, appointing uninterested AC/DCs would be a luxury that only the
wealthiest of schools could afford.
To see the magnitude of the change in faculty degrees and interests, compare the law school faculty in 1956 with the faculty in 1993.
In 1993 at least sixteen of forty-eight tenured and tenure-track professors were AC/DCs. In 1956 none of the thirty-two members were
AC/DCs. For reasons that I will not explain here, both numbers (sixteen and forty-eight) are subject to dispute, but the point is clear.
About one-third of our current faculty are Ph.D.s w/o, J.D./Ph.D.s,
or J.D.s w/o; in 1956 no one, not even radical realist Hessel Yntema,
was an AC/DC. Conceivably Hessel or one or two others might have
qualified if one stretches the definition some, but even those who occasionally wrote for nonlaw audiences did most of their work in the law.
In 1956 the faculty had many great names; most of them made their
names teaching law and writing about it.

II.

TEACHING OF THE

AC/DCs

One might think that a faculty of AC/DCs would bring undergraduate teaching styles to the law school and might dilute our precious Socratic and case-study methods even more than they have been
diluted by the modem lawyer teachers. That has not happened. In
general the AC/DCs teach conventional law courses in precisely the
same way one would expect lawyers to teach those courses. While the
lecture is more prevalent than it was ten or twenty years ago in all law
courses, the migration of AC/DCs to the law school has not caused
this phenomenon. I suspect that if you compared AC/DC teaching to
lawyers' teaching in traditional courses, you would not be able to tell
which was which. So far as I am able to tell from my colleagues and
their students, Bill Miller teaching Property or J.B. White teaching
Criminal Law would exercise the same rigor and expect the same case
analysis that the most traditional law teacher would demand. I believe
the same to be true of Rick Lempert's evidence class; Phil Soper might
be the most rigorous bastard of all. I would bet a small amount of
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money that the AC/DCs are no more deviant in their teaching of the
traditional courses than the lawyers; they may even be less so.
Some of our Ph.D.s w/o are so conscious of their nonlawyer status
that they are even more careful to be good lawyers than the lawyers
themselves. I am thinking of Bruce Frier, whose class I visited for a
semester while he visited mine. Both of us taught Contracts from the
same book. To my chagrin, he was more rigorous than I; he relentlessly pushed the students' noses into the cases and forced even the
most reluctant to analyze those cases in careful detail. Bruce's care
about and respect for doctrine far exceed that of many of his lawyer
colleagues.
Some nontraditional courses of Ph.D.s w/o are different from
traditional courses, but even more "practical." I am thinking particularly of Andy Watson's course on law and psychiatry and of Phoebe
Ellsworth's course on the jury. Both of those courses concentrate on
important events or institutions in a practicing lawyer's life, in the office or in the court room. These subjects are more relevant to the
lawyer's success than any appellate decision ever could be. Phoebe's
research into jury decisionmaking and the use of instructions to jurors
gives her an insight into an important part of trial practice that is unknown to most of us. The same, of course, is true of Andy's consideration of the relationship between the client and the lawyer, and of
Michael Bradley's consideration in corporate finance of the financial
interests that drive mergers, acquisitions, and the like.
Notwithstanding the examples set by Phoebe, Andy, and Michael,
I suspect that the AC/DCs' teaching is on the whole less "practical"
than the teaching of lawyers for other reasons. Many faculty lawyers
consult with practicing lawyers. Invariably the cases that justify a
professor consultant are interesting and novel. I have frequently enlivened my classes by the use of examples from practice. As you are well
aware, the complexity and diversity of real cases make any professor's
hypothetical cases look barren. For example, in the last several years I
have been involved in take-or-pay litigation concerning natural gas
contracts in the state and federal courts out West. The take-or-pay
contract presents difficult and unique interpretive questions under the
damage provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.). I am certain that my teaching of those sections has been
improved and the students' interest heightened by my bringing those
issues from practice into the classroom. AC/DCs are less likely than
lawyers to have that kind of practical interaction with practitioners
outside of the classroom and, accordingly, are less likely to be able to
inform their classes by that learning.
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For obvious reasons I do not want to make too much of that point.
Carried to the extreme, outside practice can stultify and interfere with
one's work in the law school; it can turn classes into egocentric story
hours if the real cases are not integrated into the other substance and
theory of the course. Since many lawyer teachers do not consult, one
cannot claim that every class would be enriched even if all AC/DCs
were turned into lawyers. Nevertheless, I suspect that the classes of
lawyers here and at other schools are often improved by issues brought
from the legal frontiers outside the law school. Except for classes like
Andy's and Phoebe's, the courses of AC/DCs are seldom enriched in
that way.
III.

CURRICULUM

Even if the presence of many AC/DCs on the faculty does not
affect the teaching in most traditional first-year courses, their presence
does affect what is not taught. As I indicate below, the curriculum of a
faculty with many AC/DCs will surely differ in systematic ways from
a curriculum of a faculty of lawyers. One would expect Bruce Frier to
want to teach a course in Roman law, Bill Miller to want to teach
Blood Feuds, J.B. White to want to teach Legal Imagination, and so
forth. That would be their normal expectation, and it would be implicit in their hiring that they would have an opportunity routinely to
do such teaching either in the law school or elsewhere. Of course, that
means that their second course cannot be Tax, Labor Law, Commercial Transactions, Corporations, Trial Practice, or the like. Our second- and third-year curricula have been significantly, if subtly, shaped
by the large number of AC/DCs on the faculty. If each of them were
replaced with a lawyer, one would expect the Arts and Sciences curriculum to shrink and the pure law curriculum to grow both broader and
deeper.
Because students and the organized bar have little influence on the
curriculum and because there are no other external restrictions, the
presence of AC/DCs on the faculty can lead to significant curricular
distortions. Particularly at elite law schools the curriculum fits the
fancy - some might say the whim - of the faculty. I perceive no
particular political bias in our selection of courses, only laissez-faire
carried to the point of irresponsibility. My AC/DC colleagues are as
willing to have me teach Negotiation or an advanced commercial law
course as I am to have them teach Political Obligation or Legal Stories
and Legal Institutions. You have heard the story of the faculty who
sets the curriculum by allowing each teacher to list what he or she
wants on a slip put in a hat. When all of the slips say "Con. Law," the
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entire curriculum is Constitutional Law. While no school has reached

that point, we feel only slightly constrained by particular student demands or by the need for substantive law coverage. The presence of

many AC/DCs means either that they will teach one semester in the
Arts and Sciences or that one of the courses they teach in the law
school will be a course principally drawn from their nonlaw specialty.

Therefore, the presence of large numbers of AC/DCs certainly has an
impact on what is and what is not offered in the second and third

years; common agreement on courses that must be taught does little to
limit this impact.
To illustrate the point, take my area of expertise. We now have no
advanced courses in Commercial Law or Bankruptcy. The course in
Consumer Credit Law formerly taught by Frank Kennedy is gone.
The course that I occasionally taught in Banking Law is gone, and the
seminars he and I taught on advanced topics in Bankruptcy, Credi-

tors' Rights, or Commercial Transactions are also gone. If three
members of the faculty taught Commercial Transactions and Bankruptcy instead of one and one half, we would certainly offer advanced
courses. Over the past ten years the same case could be made for Tax

and Labor Law. Recent additions to the faculty may alleviate the
problem in the latter two areas. Note, too, the subjects that have
never been taught but that should and would be taught if qualified
persons were on the faculty. I am thinking particularly of courses on
Real Estate Development, Real Estate Finance, and the like. To see

how thin our offerings have become in some semesters, consider the
second- and third-year courses that were offered in the winter term of
1993.1
Compared to the curriculum of a faculty made up exclusively of
1. Accounting for Lawyers; Administrative Law; Advanced Legal Research; Commercial
Transactions; Constitutional Litigation; Criminal Appellate Practice; Criminal Procedure Survey; Democratic Theory; Economics and the Law; Employment Discrimination; English Legal
History; Enterprise Organization; Estate and Gift Tax; Evidence; Evidence Workshop; Federal
Antitrust; Federal Courts; Federal Environmental Law Survey; Fourteenth Amendment; Government and Business in Western Europe; Individual Employee Relations; Insurance Law; Juries; Jurisdiction and Choice of Law; Labor Law; Law, Medicine and Bioethics; Lawyer as a
Negotiator; Modem Legal Theory; Patent Law; Professional Responsibility; Securities Regulation; Sex Equality II; Tax I; Trademarks; Trading In and With Europe II; Trial Practice; Trusts
and Estates I; Abortion and Public Policy; Business Combinations; Communication Science and
the Law; Contemporary First Amendment Issues; Estate Planning; Gender and Justice; History
of American Legal Thought; Jewish Law Seminar; Law and Culture; Liberalism and Its Critics;
Public Interest Litigation in the 90s; Race, Class & Cultural Diversity: Anthropology Perspectives; Race, Racism, and Law; Seminar on Election Law; Separation of Powers; Sexual Harassment; Tax Practice Seminar; The Criminal Law of Rape; Advanced Clinical Law; Child
Advocacy Clinic; Child Advocacy Seminar; Clinical Law I; Clinical Legal Advocacy Seminar;
Environmental Law Clinic; Legal Assistance to Urban Communities; Women and the Law.
Because some of the "practical" courses were taught at the same time, the student selection was
even narrower than appears from the list.
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lawyers, our curriculum is less rich in practical or substantive law
courses and more rich in courses drawing principally on the Arts and
Sciences. In part because more and more of our teachers have graduate degrees from, or an attachment to, a particular area of the Arts
and Sciences, other curricular changes are now being proposed that
may also lead further from and not closer to the bar and practical legal
practice.
Of course the mere demonstration that the presence of AC/DCs
leads to diminished practical or business law offerings in the second
and third years will not carry the day for our argument. You will
recall from your days as a teacher that law professors do not agree and
never have agreed about what we can and do teach. Some (Terry
Sandalow is one) argue that there is not much point in teaching a large
amount of substantive law because any law so taught will soon be forgotten or out of date and, in any case, can easily be learned after law
school. That attitude naturally favors fewer substantive law courses,
more courses on theory and perhaps even on skill development. You
and I would argue that much substantive law can be efficiently taught
in the classroom and that knowledge of substantive law is an important ingredient in the successful practice of law. I would go beyond
that assertion; I maintain that highly theoretical courses are of smaller
value to most of our students than my colleagues claim. This not because the insights from theoretical courses are unhelpful to a lawyer,
but because most of our students do not have the intellectual enzymes
to transform these abstract ideas into digestible, intellectual food. In
such courses the teachers say X, but the students hear Y The teacher
sees manifold opportunities to apply his theories in other courses, but
the students cannot see beyond the horizon that consists of a merciful
escape from the torment of theory. The teacher writes an examination
that calls for "student analysis and creative use of the theory"; the
student knows that faithful regurgitation on the final examination will
earn an A.
While there is not a direct connection between one's curricular
opinion and one's status as an AC/DC, I think they are related. I
would expect the large presence of AC/DCs on a faculty to bend any
curricular change toward the theoretical and away from the practical.
One must concede, on the other hand, that many of the AC/DCs have
a sincere respect for law and a few, particularly some of the Ph.D.s
w/o, have a bent toward the practical that exceeds even that of the
lawyers.
In any event, my observation of our own curriculum and of the
pending proposals for its modification leads me to agree with you in
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general. It seems to me that the new courses we are offering are more
heavily weighted toward theory as practiced in the Arts and Sciences
and less heavily weighted toward practical legal application and substantive legal learning. To the extent that more of our colleagues regard themselves not merely as legal scholars, but as scholars in the
Arts and Sciences as well, one would expect them to support and encourage such change in the curriculum. Even if they do not support
such change, their presence means the absence of others who would
teach practical, substantive law courses.

IV.

RESEARCH

Although I have not counted the pages of practical and nonpractical research in elite legal publications, surely it is true that the "theoretical" greatly exceeds the "practical." The elite journals (and,
perhaps even more so, those that aspire to be elite) publish far more
pages than formerly that are directed only at other academics and not
at members of the bar. Few of the articles in most of the elite journals
would be of interest to - some not even comprehensible by - a practicing lawyer. Good doctrinal research that might have appeared in
elite journals twenty or thirty years ago has been driven mostly to
lesser journals, to treatises, or to nonlaw school publications such as
The Business Lawyer.
Why the change? Partly it is a function of who controls the reviews. Since these journals are mostly run by extremely smart but
extremely inexperienced students, it should not be surprising that current fashion is closely followed in the reviews. The editors of an elite
law review who published a purely doctrinal issue might endanger
their elite status by such nonconformity. Also, the student editors are
influenced by the intellectual inclinations of the faculty. To the extent
that doctrinal research is in eclipse and more theoretical writing is
favored, one would expect the student editors to favor the latter over
the former simply because their choices reflect the dominant views of
the faculty.
The current tenure process also has a hand in determining what is
and what is not written. It is now far more difficult to qualify for
tenure than when I received it in 1968 or when you did in 1973. It is
often unclear to an external (in some cases to an internal) observer
why one person receives tenure and another is denied. Nor do our
rules - which are necessarily vague about the quality of work - minimize that uncertainty. As a consequence, a tenure candidate views
the process through opaque glass. Even a candidate who should be
completely confident cannot be convinced of that. Presumably, there-
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fore, every single nontenured person asks himself or herself, "What
will this or that group of the faculty think of this piece of work?" To
the extent that doctrinal work is held in lower repute by even a significant part of the faculty (only one-third blocks the grant of tenure), the
candidate who relies on such writing for tenure runs a risk. Even in
the 1960s, when I was up for tenure, some of these things influenced
my decision. My second piece published in this Review was entitled
Some Petty Complaints About Article Three.2 I carefully withheld that
article from the tenure committee because even then I did not want
them to suspect that I was a mere technician writing only for lawyers.
I suspect that your perception, namely that doctrinal and "practical" work is less well respected than more theoretical work, is correct
and is so perceived by the candidates for tenure. That fact will dissuade tenure candidates who are the least bit neurotic from presenting
doctrinal work for more than a small part of their portfolio. Because
youngsters contribute more to the elite reviews than old people and
because they are the ones so influenced by the perception, this phenomenon may skew the research in the elite journals even more than
would otherwise be the case.
Beyond the deleterious influence of the tenure process and of the
predilections of the students who run our reviews, I am quite uncertain about why one thing and not another is written. I am even more
uncertain about what and how much should be written. But here I am
more sanguine than you are. I suspect that most of our writing can
only be justified as a form of self-teaching. Clearly that is the justification for almost all student writing. (When did you last read and profit
from a student piece?) Students' writing can and should be fully justified as part of their education; we should expect nothing more of it.
Any writer, including young and old faculty, benefits from the discipline of putting things in print. Much legal writing, such as my own
1968 article on negotiable instruments, should not be justified on the
basis of its benefit to some remote audience. Much writing can and
should be justified as a form of self-teaching by faculty and by
students.
Other writing, including much of which you and I think little,
might be classified as intellectual exhibition. When she is dressed up
in her best dress, my four-year-old granddaughter is fond of holding
out her arms and squealing: "Look at me; look at me." Much legal
writing published in the elite and other journals falls into the "look at
2. James 3. Vhite, Some Petty Complaints About Article Three, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1315
(1967).
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me" category. It is not intended for lawyers; it is not principally to
educate the author; it is merely to exhibit the beauty of the writer's
intellect to an adoring audience.
Finally are those for whom writing has become second nature;
they are like aging athletes who cannot shake the habit of working out.
Surely, Brian Simpson fits that category; Richard Posner is another
good example. I would also put Jerry Israel and myself in that category. That some of the writing of this group might be "practical" is
mere happenstance, for these persons are not principally motivated by
a desire to educate but by the need to write.
The work of the faculty of 1956 makes an interesting comparison
with the writing of today's faculty. First, they did not write as much
as current faculty members do. Second, what they wrote was often
specifically directed at lawyers and judges. Often their writings appeared in bar journals and the like. But even the faculty of 1956 wrote
many things that were not directed at lawyers but only at other scholars, sometimes scholars from other disciplines or other countries.
Consider for example, William Wirt Blume's Probateand Administration on the American Frontier: A Study of the Probate Records of
Wayne County - Northwest Territory 1796-1803, Indiana Territory
1803-05, Michigan Territory 1805-1816,3 or Al Conard's empirical
study of the costs of automobile accidents, Automobile Accident Costs
and Payments: Studies in the Economics of Injury Reparation.4 Jack
Dawson ranged from the mundane Estoppel and Statutes of Limitations 5 to the sublime The Equitable Remedies of the French Chancery
Before 1789.6 Even Paul Kauper, a prototypical lawyer in my terms,
wrote The Constitutions of West Germany and the United States: A
Comparative Study.7
Perhaps more representative of that time is George Palmer's writing on The ContractPrice as a Limitation on Restitution for Defendant's Breach8 and his treatise on restitution. 9 One of Lewis Simes'
3. William W. Blume, Probateand Administration on the American Frontier: A Study of the
ProbateRecordsof Wayne County - Northwest Territory 1796-1803; Indiana Territory 1803-05;
Michigan Territory 1805-16, 58 MICH. L. REv. 209 (1959).
4. ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES
IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964).

5. John P. Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes of Limitations, 34 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1935).
6. John P. Dawson, The EquitableRemedies of the French Chancery Before 1789, in 1 FEsTSCHRIFT FOR ERNST RABEL 99 (Hans Dblle et al. eds., 1954).

7. Paul G. Kauper, The Constitutionsof West Germany and the UnitedStates: A Comparative Study, 58 MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1960).
8. George E. Palmer, The ContractPriceasaLimiton Restitutionfor Defendant's Breach, 20
OHIO ST. L.J. 264 (1959).
9. GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978).
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early pieces, Fifty Years of Future Interests,10 appeared in the Harvard
Law Review. He, too, was the author of a treatise on future interests.1
Probably the writers of 1956 were less prolific; some seem to have
written very little. But those who did write often published in bar
journals and, even when their work was published in elite reviews, it
was frequently quite doctrinal and directly applicable to existing practical controversies. Yet even then there was a strong interest in comparative law, and much of the writing of Blume, Dawson, and Kauper
had a historical or comparative aspect. This comparison of the work
of the faculty of 1956 with the work of the current faculty supports
your argument, namely, that there has been a drift away from work
for the bench and bar, even though some significant work done at that
time was not directed at the bar. Since 1956 there has been a gradual
yet large change in the emphasis of, and interest shown by, faculty
research.
Return to the youngsters on our faculty. Their work gives hope
for the future of "practical" research. Two who have recently received
tenure, Kent Syverud and Jeff Lehman, have produced or are producing materials of important practical significance that will and should
be read by lawyers. Jeff is working with Doug Kahn on a tax hornbook, and Kent's articles on insurance, Insurance Law Out of the
Shadows1 2 and The Duty to Settle, 3 published in elite reviews, will be
read with profit by lawyers, judges, and persons in the insurance industry. Perhaps we can take heart from that.
Ultimately I share your view that the world would be better if
there were more writing in the law schools for lawyers and judges, but
I do not go as far as you do. What is written, why it is written, and
where it is published are questions of considerable complexity. People
write for many reasons and to fit many audiences, including themselves. It is even possible that the younger generation is making some
tentative steps toward practical research and will write more things
that are aimed at lawyers and judges than the prior generation.
V.

THE GOOD NEWS

Now I turn to the good news: the reasons I think some of your
fears are exaggerated. First, I think both your exemplars, Justice Felix
10. Lewis M. Simes, Fifty Years of Future Interests, 50 HARV. L. REv. 749 (1937).
11. LEwis M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1956).
12. Kent D. Syverud, Insurance Law out of the Shadows, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1429 (1991)
(reviewing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS).

13. Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113 (1990).
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Frankfurter and Professor George Priest, were wrong. With characteristic arrogance, Justice Frankfurter exaggerates the role of law
schools in "making law and lawyers." To say that we "make" either
law or lawyers is to ignore what we do or ever have done, either to our
students by our teaching or to the "law" by our writing. We have a
modest influence on the students and an even more limited impact on
the law. Apart from occasional giants like Karl Llewellyn, few professors can claim to change the law fundamentally. Even those of us who
write for judges and lawyers, and who are often cited in the opinions
of appellate courts, have modest impact. When a court cites White
and Summers, 14 1 am always flattered, but I appreciate that the typical
citation to our work is merely glue to hold in place an idea that came
from elsewhere.
What of our influence on students? We do, of course, teach some
law, but what else? We claim that we teach our students to "think like
lawyers," and perhaps we do. But I suspect that the intellectual rigor
that is "thinking like a lawyer" is as much taught in mathematics,
physics, and sometimes even in history or English as here. By the time
they reach us, law students' minds and souls are set in cement that is
fast hardening. That is why teachers of ethics courses are so frustrated
and why those courses are so poorly received. Far from "making lawyers" of our malleable students, mostly we bloody our nails.
Professor Priest's claim is even further from the mark than Justice
Frankfurter's. The claim that law schools will soon become graduate
schools of the Arts and Sciences is nonsense; I doubt even Professor
Priest believes it. You know, of course, Professor Priest is a member
of the Yale Law School faculty. Since before you were born, Yale has
reveled in its deviance. Even if Yale becomes a graduate school, it is
unlikely that any others will follow it. But my guess is that many on
the Yale faculty would disagree with Professor Priest's proposition.
Many Yale graduates do well in practice precisely because, as I
pointed out, law schools exert a modest influence on any student. If
one attracts a bright enough set of students who are sufficiently selfmotivated and ambitious, one need not teach them anything. Their
intelligence, motivation, and ambition will overcome or hide every deficiency in their legal education. Were the Yale students more numerous, less gifted, and more interested in practicing law, Yale would
have to pay more attention to teaching law. (Would you want President Clinton as your lawyer?)
It is unfortunate but hardly tragic that our teaching does not di14.

JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

HeinOnline -- 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2188 1992-1993

(3d ed. 1988).

August 1993]

Letter to Judge Edwards

2189

rectly contribute to our students' success as lawyers. Contrary to the
implications of Justice Frankfurter's remarks, the law schools have not
descended from great to little influence over the students and the law.
Rather we have descended from modest significance to slightly more
modest significance, a matter that should concern us but not as greatly
as you suggest.
Even if I am wrong about our influence on law and lawyers, there
is reason for hope. I see our young faculty moving back toward the
bar. As I have indicated above, both Kent Syverud and Jeff Lehman
are writing and have written things that will be of interest to lawyers
and judges. Both of them are involved in the community and with
lawyers in many ways. Both of them had an interesting law practice
before they came to the law school. Two of our other youngsters,
Debra Livingston and Deborah Malamud, came to us last year - one
from the U.S. Attorney's office and private practice in Manhattan and
the other from a Washington law firm. Like Kent and Jeff, they enjoyed law practice, feel an affiliation with the bar, and bring important
lessons from their practice. Debra Livingston was the prosecutor of
Imelda Marcos and had to face Gerry Spence in court. Deborah
Malamud was involved in the nitty-gritty of labor law for a Washington labor-side firm. Even the young AC/DCs (here I am thinking of
Heidi Feldman and Avery Katz) are respectful of lawyers and are
deeply interested in how the law works and in legal institutions.
Moreover, one of our other youngsters, Rick Pildes, whose writing in
public choice is hardly the thing that a typical lawyer would write or
read, is a fine lawyer. Last year he wrote a winning brief in the
Supreme Court in GeneralMotors Corp. v. Romein.15 I suspect, therefore, that the claims you hear from your clerks about the academic
disdain for practice were actually more characteristic of Lee Bollinger's generation than of the current youngsters. I certainly see none of
this disdain from our young people and, quite the opposite, I see close
association with the bar in the work and writing of many of our
youngest teachers.
Perhaps the fashions in research, teaching, and writing are cyclical.
Instead of deviating ever farther from the standard to which you and I
would adhere, our young people may be moving back toward that
standard. That is not to say that all of these young scholars are going
to become doctrinal writers or indeed that most of their writing will be
directed to lawyers and judges, but it does mean that the kind of disdain for practice that you describe is not shared by them. It does
15. 112 S. Ct. 1105 (1992).
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mean that many of them will write for lawyers and judges and will be
engaged with lawyers and judges in other ways, both in and out of the
law school. So, if our school is any measure, I think you should take
heart. Here even the young AC/DCs are good lawyers, and many of
our youngest lawyers will be recognized by the next generation as important contributors to the bench and bar.
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